




This article deals with the particular problems inherent in the
construction industry that prevent employees from choosing
whether to be represented by unions. The article examines three
recent Supreme Court decisions that have given employers the
freedom to choose whether or not their employees will be repre-
sented by a union. While the Court was motivated by a desire to
prevent union domination of employees, the Court failed to per-
ceive the unique role that unions play in the construction indus-
try and the protection that unions provide for the worker.
Moreover, the goal of employee free choice is, in fact, subverted by
these decisions.**
INTRODUCTION
One of the central features of the National Labor Relations Act'
(NLRA or the Act) is its emphasis on employee choice in the se-
lection of a representative for collective bargaining. 2 In the para-
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1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 72
Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§151-68
(1976)).
2. Section 7, the cornerstone of the Act, provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
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digmatic industrial setting, such as the factory, the system can
function so as to give employees an opportunity to select a repre-
sentative (or choose not to be represented at all). This system
does not and cannot work in the construction industry. Because
of the unique nature and structure of the industry, employees are
not given an opportunity to participate in an organizational cam-
paign and express their preferences in an election. Instead, by
custom, case law and statute, and, out of necessity, alternative ar-
rangements have developed.
Unions in the construction industry organize employers rather
than employees. In this and in other ways, unions are truly a part
of the industry. Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court
and the National Labor Relations Board3 (NLRB or the Board)
have demonstrated a lack of understanding of the nature of the
industry, the role played in it by the unions, and the role that un-
ions play in providing for the needs of the employees. Under the
rubric of employee free choice, the Court and the Board may have
changed the balance of power between employers and unions in
the industry effectively giving free choice to the employers. This
article will examine those decisions and their probable impact.
First, the article will look at the structure of the construction in-
dustry. Specifically, it will discuss how the product of the indus-
try has determined the industry's organization and how its
organization affects labor relations. Second, the article will scruti-
nize how the law has developed in regard to the construction in-
dustry. Attention will be paid to the ways in which Congress, the
Board and the courts have made or have failed to make special
accommodations for the problems that are created by the struc-
ture of the industry. Finally, the article will examine three recent
cases, NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers,4 South Prairie Construc-
tion Co. v. Local 627, Operating Engineers,5 and Connell Construc-
tion Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,6 which illustrate
the organizational and representational problems in the industry
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition to employment as au-
thorized in section 8(a) (3).
29 U.S.C. §157 (1976). Section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158, and § 8(b) (1) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976) prohibit employers and unions, respectively, from
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by § 7.
3. Hereinafter referred to as the "Board" or the "NLRB."
4. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
5. 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
6. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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and how the Board and the Supreme Court have, in various ways,
failed to pay heed to those problems. It will be shown that the de-
cisions reduce industrial democracy without any compensating
benefit to the employees.
The article concludes that the National Labor Relations Act, as
construed by the Board and the Supreme Court, does not ade-
quately allow for employee free choice in the construction indus-
try. Rather, employers in the industry are being allowed to
choose whether to be unionized or not. This is a perversion of the
Act caused by its uncritical application in a unique context.
STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Industry Characteristics
The construction industry occupies a major place in the nation's
economy. The amount spent on construction in the United States
ranges between 13-14% of the Gross National Product.7 The in-
dustry provides employment for 5-6% of the total labor force and
7-10% of the male labor force.8 In terms of employment, as of
1970, it was the largest industry in the United States.9
Most of the distinguishing features of the industry and the la-
bor relations systems that have evolved are directly related to the
characteristics of the products of construction. Buildings, from
small houses to skyscrapers, are the industry's major products,
but a significant sector of the industry is organized for the con-
struction of roads, bridges, dams, oil refineries, etc. While gener-
alizations are particularly difficult in an industry characterized by
diversity, it will be helpful, for analysis and discussion, to de-
scribe the industry with some basic and general terms.
The industry and its products are generally broken down into
four categories:' 0
1) Residential-single family units, apartments, dormitories and hotels;
7. W. HABER & H. LEVINSON, LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE
BUILDING TRADES 6 (1956); D.Q. MILLS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN
CONSTRUCTION 4 (1972); D.Q. Mills, Construction, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CON-
TEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 60 (Somers ed. 1980); (all percentages herein
are estimates because of the nature of the industry).
8. D.Q. MILLS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN CONSTRUCTION,
.supra note 7, at 5.
9. Id.
10. These categories are taken from the organization used in H. NORTHRUP &
H.G. FOSTER, OPEN SHOP CONSTRUCTION 8 (1975).
2) Commercial-stores, office buildings, warehouses, small factories;
3) Industrial-large factories, power plants, refineries; and
4) Heavy and Highway-roads, bridges, dams, pipelines, subways, etc.
The lines between these categories are not always clear. An
apartment building and an office building may have more in com-
mon than an apartment building and a single family house. But
for statistical purposes, apartments are usually included in refer-
ences to residential construction.
As diverse as these various structures are, they have a number
of features that unify them and distinguish them from the typical
products of manufacturing. These features also lead to the indus-
try's special labor relations systems and problems."1
Immobility
The products of construction are generally quite large and inca-
pable of being moved. Accordingly, they are produced at the
buyer's location. This means that the work of the industry takes
place at numerous, changing places. One result is the existence
of construction firms in every part of the country. Another result
is the relative absence of large national firms.12
Another consequence is that there is no one central location at
which to find and organize employees. An electrical contractor,
for example, may have employees at fifteen different construction
sites and those sites could be hundreds of miles apart. In addi-
tion, the locations will change as the projects are completed and
new projects are undertaken. To go out and "organize" the em-
ployees, as that term is known, is virtually impossible in construc-
tion.
Complexity
Even the simplest house requires a variety of skills to con-
struct. Foundation work is dissimilar from carpentry, electrical
and plumbing operations. As the product grows, so does the com-
plexity. A further factor is the custom made nature of the prod-
uct. Each structure is designed and made to order. Little or no
mass production exists in the industry.'3
11. HABER & LEvINsoN, supra note 7, at 11.
12. Id. at 9. "No firm does more than 1 percent by volume of receipts of the
work in the industry nationally." MILLs, INDURsTIrL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 7, at 7. In the Heavy and Highway sector, however,
there are firms that gross in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually. NOR-
THRup & FoSTER, supra note 10, at 102.
13. There is a type of mass production in the residential housing sector where
a large number of identical houses may be built in one location. In this type of
development some of the techniques of mass production may be used.
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One main consequence of this complexity or diversity is the or-
ganization of construction companies by specialty.' 4 There are
general contractors who may bid on and arrange for the construc-
tion of a building, but no large building is ever built by one organ-
ization. Instead, parts of the work are subcontracted to firms that
specialize in one phase of construction. Accordingly, at any one
location there will be a multiplicity of employers.
A concomitant feature is the organization of employees in the
industry along craft lines.' 5 Each employer in construction will
have one or more crafts or trades represented in its work force.
Therefore, for purposes of organizing for unionization, a union
must not only deal with geographical constraints; it must identify
the employees on a site by employer and by craft. These
problems may make traditional organizing impossible.
The multiplicity of employers and employee trades at a con-
struction site and the problems that are caused in terms of labor
relations cannot be overstated. More than 44% of all construction
receipts are subcontracted,' 6 with general contractors subcon-
tracting out over 63% of their gross receipts.' 7 There are nineteen
major unions that are represented in construction.' 8
The potential for labor disputes at any given site is readily ap-
parent. In addition, a dispute between any employer and any
group of employees will affect all other firms and employees at
the site. If the union with a grievance pickets a site and the pick-
et line is honored, the job will be shut down immediately. Even if
this does not happen, a strike by one trade will prevent an item of
work from being completed. In a very short time, that unfinished
step in the project will prevent other work from going forward.
Finally, and of utmost importance in terms of the system of la-
bor relations, the organization of employers and employees by
task affects the duration of employment. Employment relation-
ships in construction are transitory. A worker will be hired when
his or her services are needed on a project and let go when that
phase of the project is completed. Construction workers drift
14. MzIL, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN CONSTRUCTION, supra note
7, at 6.
15. HABER & LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 31.
16. MILS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN CONSTRUCTION, supra note
7, at 9-10.
17. Id.
18. Mills, Construction, supra note 7, at 58-9.
from project to project, employer to employer and even from one
geographical location to another.
In this setting, a union cannot possibly go and organize the em-
ployees of a particular employer. But the union can serve as an
employment service and provide employees to construction firms
and distribute jobs to members. This, in fact, is one of the key
roles that unions play in the industry. By performing this service,
they provide security to employees and stability and flexibility to
the industry.19
Seasonality
Because construction takes place outside, and because many
operations cannot be performed in cold or wet weather, the indus-
try is seasonal. This exacerbates the need to have flexibility in
terms of the duration of the employment relationship. Once
again, the union will serve the industry and the employees by dis-
tributing available jobs.
The Anatomy of a Construction Project 2O
A typical project will start with a buyer, or owner, contacting a
design professional to create plans for a structure that will meet
its needs. This design professional, generally but not necessarily
an architect, will produce a set of plans and, perhaps, some cost
estimates. Often, the design process of a building will involve the
services of many firms: architectural and engineering firms which
may specialize in every phase of construction from landscaping
and site development to structural and mechanical design.
Once the plans are set, they will be given out for bid. Bidders
on projects are typically general contractors who will do some of
the work and serve as brokers for the work to be performed by
subcontractors. The project is usually awarded to the lowest bid-
der, so accurate bidding is essential to getting business and stay-
ing in business.
In order to bid, the contractor (either the general or sub) will
do a "take-off' of the work it plans to do with its own forces. This
"take-off' is an estimation of the amount of labor and materials
necessary to perform the work. Materials will be priced and labor
will be calculated based on negotiated or estimated wage rates.
19. HABER & LEvINSoN, .supra note 7, at 45. There is, however, a large nonun-
ion sector of the construction industry that exists without the services of the un-
ions. See generally H. NORTHmUP & ILG. FOSTER, supra note 10. See also
discussion of the nonunion sector, notes 31-49 and accompanying text infra.
20. The information contained in this section was learned by the author while
practicing in the area of construction contract litigation.
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Here one can see the advantage of having contracts with a union
so that labor rates are known and total labor costs can be pre-
dicted with some degree of certainty. In addition, a labor agree-
ment with a union ties the contractor into a source of skilled
laborers assuring an adequate supply of workers for the project.
Special provisions in the law have been enacted in order to allow
a contractor to enter into agreements with unions even before the
contractor has any employees.
21
Once the project gets under way, it will have its own particular
flow of work and operations. Changing work will require chang-
ing work forces. For example, plumbers may do a little work prior
to the pouring of the foundation and then be off the project for
weeks while the structural steel is being erected. It is very possi-
ble that, except for the superintendant, no plumber who worked
on the project initially has any contact with it when the later
plumbing work is installed.
Unions in Construction
Unions in construction are organized along craft lines because
of the variety of skills needed in any construction project. Many
of these craft unions were organized in the early 1800's, and by
the beginning of the twentieth century, the major craft unions
were established nationally.2 2
Craft consciousness is still important in construction as each
union guards its domain or jurisdiction with great zeal. As early
as 1908, the major craft unions joined together to form the Build-
ing and Construction Trades Department to take care of jurisdic-
tional disputes that arose.2 3 Even though jurisdictional strikes
are illegal today,24 they account for between 30-40% of the strikes
in the industry. Fortunately, these strikes tend to be brief and
may only involve a few workers.2 5
By guarding its jurisdiction, a union is protecting jobs for its
members, which is one of the union's main functions. Jobs are
also procured when a contractor is organized by the union and
signs a collective bargaining agreement with it. As more contrac-
21. See notes 82-144 and accompanying text infra.
22. HAMER & LEvINSON, supra note 7, at 30.
23. Id. at 31.
24. See §8(b) (4) (D) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
25. MILis, INDusTRAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN CONSTHUcTION, supra note
7, at 48-49; H. NoRTHRUP & ILG. FOSTER, supra note 10, at 13.
tors are organized, the unions are better able to distribute work to
their members and ensure continuous employment opportunities.
The various craft unions are organized in a variety of ways.
26
The basic unit is the local, whose geographical jurisdiction could
be a part of a city or an entire county. The local organization has
historically been fairly autonomous in terms of wage negotiations.
This has given the individual union member some meaningful in-
put into the operations and goals of the union.27
In many areas, the locals have formed district councils and
have bargained as such. This is particularly true in large cities
where there are many locals. The unions benefit by added size
and strength. The employers approve of this arrangement be-
cause it eliminates the need for negotiating many contracts in or-
der to work in different parts of the city.28 One recent trend in
the industry has been towards expanding the size of the bargain-
ing unit.29
The national organization provides assistance in legal matters
and in lobbying for beneficial labor legislation. It also negotiates
agreements with large contractors that work all over the country
so that they need not negotiate with a local or district council in
order to bid on work in a new area.30
Nonunion Construction
Though unions play a dominant role in labor relations in the
construction industry, it is not an exclusive one. There are many
areas of the country where unions do not have any strength and
where contractors operate an "open shop." The extent of open
shop competition has increased in the past and may increase in
the future as a result of Supreme Court and National Labor Rela-
tions Board decisions to be discussed.3 ' An understanding of the
open shop sector will be helpful in evaluating those decisions.
3 2
The extent of open shop construction varies both by geography
and by type of construction. The northern, eastern, and far west-
ern sections of the country are more widely unionized than the
26. See generally Mills, Construction, supra note 7, at 58-60.
27. H. NORTHRUP & H.G. FOSTER, supra note 10, at 13.
28. See generally MILLS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN CONSTRUC-
TION, supra note 7, at 31-55.
29. See generally Hartman & Franke, The Changing Bargaining Structure in
Constructiorn Wide-Area and Multicraft Bargaining, 33 INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RE-
LATIONS REv. 170 (1980).
30. Mills, Construction, supra note 7, at 67-69.
31. See notes 134-44, 193-202, & 293-94 and accompanying text infra.
32. See generally H. NoRTimuP & H.G. FOSTER, supra note 10.
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southern and certain central areas.33 Within any given geographi-
cal area, the extent of open shop competition will increase as the
distance from a metropolitan center increases.34
The open shop sector of the industry is strongest in residential
construction, accounting for approximately 80-90% of the single
family homes built and approximately 50% of all multiple resi-
dence construction.35 The success of the open shop in residential
construction is due to the limited size of the projects and contrac-
tors who engage in them. A small project requires a limited
amount of labor and thus access to the union hiring hall is not es-
sential. In addition, the unions lack the resources to police this
area of construction.3 6
Industrial construction, on the other hand, is a union
stronghold, and it has only recently felt a challenge from the open
shop movement.37 These larger projects need many skilled work-
ers which the unions can supply, and the unions are willing to
fight for these projects since the money involved in each is great.
In addition, construction of industrial facilities generally takes
place in or around cities, where unions generally have great
strength. Yet, as the open shop contractors grow in size and
strength, and as industrialization moves to the nonunion sunbelt,
the extent of open shop industrial construction has increased and
will continue to increase.38
Commercial construction has traditionally been a union
stronghold but the open shop movement has made great gains
here.39 Heavy and highway construction have also felt the effects
of the open shop movement despite state and federal laws which
prevent the open shop contractors from paying substandard
wages.4o
As indicated earlier, the unions assist the industry by providing
a ready source of skilled labor. They also help to train labor
33. MIus, INDUSTRIAL RELATION S AND MANPOWER IN CONSTRUCTION, supra note
7, at 16-18; H. NORTHRUP & H.G. FOsTER, supra note 10, at 350-51.
34. H. NORTHRUP & I.G. FOSTER, supra note 10, at 350.
35. Id. at 349.
36. 7d. at 64-65.
37. Id. at 99-120.
38. Id.
39. Id., generally at 72-78 and at 350.
40. See e.g., Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §276a and §220 of
the New York Labor Law, both of which provide that wages paid shall be the pre-
vailing rate. This most often means the union rate.
through apprenticeship programs. The open shop sector does not
have access to the hiring hall and must use other, less efficient
means to procure and train employees. Current and past employ-
ees provide one source of labor and a reference point for addi-
tional help.41 State employment services and vocational schools
provide other sources of labor. Recently, employer organizations
have created more formal job referral systems which are modeled
after the hiring hall.42 Training, where necessary, is usually con-
ducted on an informal, on-the-job basis.43 Because training and
recruitment are significant problems, open shop contractors will
try to keep their employees for as long as possible.44
Despite the problems of labor recruitment, the open shop con-
tractors ban be extremely competitive because their labor costs
average substantially less than union shops doing the same
work.45 Wages in open shop construction are lower but the pre-
cise amount is not easily ascertainable.46 Fringe benefits are also
lower (there are, obviously, no union pension fund contributions)
but again, the difference is not known.47
Other ways in which the open shop contractor can reduce labor
costs include:
(1) the employment of helpers or learners at low rates of pay; (2) the use
of laborers to do ... journeyman work ... ; (3) the absence of premium
pay for such things as shift work . . . and the use of certain types of
equipment; (4) [reduced overtime payment]; (5) avoidance of... juris-
dictional... lines; (6) absence of minimum-crew-size rules; (7) absence
of stand-by men; and (8) absence of ... journeyman to foreman ratios.48
It has been estimated that the above factors, including reduced
wages, can lead to a 50% savings in labor costs which enables
open shop contractors to bid approximately 8% less for any given
project.49
Open shop competition has increased and formalized to the
point where open shop contractors are able to provide themselves
with training and labor allocation arrangements that supplant the
need for unions. This sector of the open shop has been referred
to as the merit shop construction.50 But while an increase in open
41. H. NoRTmRUP & H.G. FOSTER, supra note 10, at 209-11.
42. Id. at 214-17.
43. Id. at 237.
44. Id. at 122.
45. Id. at 319. See also Foster, Industrial Relations in Construction: 1970-77, 11
INDusTRIAL RELATIONS 1, 4 (1978).
46. H. NORTHRUP & H.G. FOsTER, supra note 10, at 285; Mills, Construction,
supra note 7, at 83.
47. Id.
48. Mills, Construction, supra note 7, at 91.
49. H. NoRTHRuP & H.G. FOSTER, supra note 10, at 319.
50. Mills, Construction, supra note 7, at 49 and 89-91.
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shop construction has helped contractors who want to be open
shop, no similar benefits have accrued to employees.
From the standpoint of the employee, the union shop offers
more money. The local, which has been characterized as "work-
ably democratic," 51 offers the individual employee some say in
the incidences of his or her employment. No analogous form of
input exists in the open shop, and there is no reason to assume
that the open shop is preferred to the union shop by employees
generally. Thus, the decisions examined, which may shift the bal-
ance in the industry towards open shop, may not further the in-
terests of the employees.
LEGAL HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Though the construction industry has a unique structure that
creates special problems in labor relations, the law has not fol-
lowed a consistent course in its treatment of the construction in-
dustry. This section of the article will briefly sketch the legal
history of labor relations in the construction industry.
The Wagner Act52
The Wagner Act made no special provisions for the construc-
tion industry. As written, all of its provisions should have been
fully applicable to labor relations in construction. Yet the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, for reasons that were never made
explicit, refused to assert jurisdiction in cases involving the con-
struction industry.5 3
Under this policy of laissez faire, the unions had great strength,
and the closed shop became prevalent in the industry. It has
51. H. NORTHRUP & H.G. FOSTER, supra note 10, at 14.
52. Officially, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 29 U.S.C. §§151-69
(1976).
53. Brown & Root, 51 NLRB Dec. 820 (1943); Johns-Manvlle, 61 NLRB Dec. 1
(1945). For general background on the changes in the application of the NLRA to
the construction industry, see BERTRAM, CONSOLIDATED BARGAINING IN CALIFORNIA
CONSTRUCTION (1966); Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley on the Building
and Construction Industry, 60 YALE L.J. 673 (1951); Sherman, Legal Status of the
Building and Construction Trades Unions in the Hiring Process, 47 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 203 (1958); Fenton, Union Hiring Halls Under the Taft Hartley Act, 9 LABOR
L.T. 505 (1958); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851 & 1086 (1960); Flemming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley
Amendments, 54 NORTHWESTERN L.R. 666, 702-08 (1960).
been estimated that as of 1945, 80% of the industry was unionized
and 95% of all union contracts had closed shop provisions.5 4 In
this situation, the union hiring hall became firmly entrenched as
the source of all jobs in construction. This inured to the benefit of
unions and was also accepted by the employers who were assured
of adequate numbers of skilled workers.
Taft-Hartley55
Taft-Hartley did not effectuate any changes in the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board, but the inclusion of a pro-
hibition against jurisdictional strikes and the legislative history of
other unfair labor practice provisions made it clear that Congress
intended that the construction industry be regulated.5 6 The in-
dustry was not, however, amenable to a full scale application of
the NLRA.
One of the first problems arose with Taft-Hartley's prohibition
of the closed shop provision.5 7 The union shop provision, under
which employees did not have to join the union until thirty days
after employment commenced, did not give the union much se-
curity where the term of employment was often less than thirty
days.58 In addition, the union security provision could only be in-
cluded in a contract if it were authorized by employees in a spe-
cial election.59 With job tenure severely limited and with
construction taking place at numerous sites, the election require-
ment posed a great problem.
The first General Counsel to confront the election problem esti-
mated that the cost of elections in the industry would be between
1-1.5 million dollars. A pilot program of his actually cost 16 dollars
per vote and that was with the full cooperation of the unions and
employers involved.60 Ultimately, he recommended that the
Board ignore the statute.
61
The Board refused to heed that advice, and in Guy F. Atkinson,
54. HABER & LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 62.
55. Officially, the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
amended by 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§141-97 (1976)).
56. Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (D) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976) prohibits the ju-
risdictional strike. Injunctive relief may be obtained under section 10(i), codified
at 29 U.S.C. §160 (1976).
57. Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976) prohibited the closed
shop. See generally Comment, YALE LJ., supra note 53, at 690.
58. Id.
59. Former §9(e) (1), repealed by Pub. L. No. 189, 82d Congress, approved Oc-
tober 22, 1951.
60. Comment, YALE L.J., supra note 53, at 692-93.
61. Id.
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Co.,62 it invalidated a union security clause because no special
referendum had been held.63 Congress solved the specific prob-
lem raised in Atkinson when it eliminated the special union se-
curity clause election requirement.64 But the thirty day waiting
period was still a problem for unions, and elections were still pos-
sible, though inappropriate, where employers did not voluntarily
recognize a union.
In practice, through 1955, the unions and employers in the in-
dustry ignored the law and continued to operate under closed
shop arrangements. 65 Even if the collective bargaining agree-
ments only referred to industry experience as a hiring criteria,
the union members were bound to have more experience. Where
such a qualification did not aid the union members, the dispatch-
ers at the hiring halls just ignored the written agreements and re-
ferred nonunion personnel only when all union members were
fully employed.66'
The Board did not give serious attention to this problem until
1956 when it imposed severe penalties in the case of Plumbers Lo-
cal 231 (Brown-Olds).67 In Brown-Olds the Board determined
that the remedy for the operation of an illegal closed shop provi-
sion would be a reimbursement of all dues and fees paid during
that period.68 The Brown-Olds remedy was eventually overruled
by the Supreme Court,69 but it prodded the unions and employers
into some revision of the closed shop practice.
The Board also attacked the operation of union hiring halls
even where no illegal closed shop provision was in effect. In
NLRB v. Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Assoc. General Contrac-
tors,7 0 the Board held that hiring hall agreements would not be
legal unless they contained the following language:
(1) Selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a non-discrimi-
natory basis and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by, union
membership ....
(2) The employer retains the right to reject any job applicant referred by
the union.
62. 90 NLRB Dec. 27 (1950).
63. Id.
64. See note 59 supra.
65. HABER & LEVINSON, .supra note 7, at 71-72; BERTRAM, supra note 53, at 70-71.
66. See generally BERTRAM, supra note 53, at 70-77.
67. 115 NLRB Dec. 594 (1956).
68. Id. at 597.
69. Local 60, Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
70. 119 NLRB Dec. 883 (1958).
(3) The parties to the agreement post... all provisions relating to the
functioning of the hiring arrangement, including the safeguards we deem
essential .... 71
The Board was partially overruled, but absent appropriate lan-
guage in the hiring hall provision, the burden fell on the parties to
show that the contract was not discriminatory.7 2
A totally separate problem raised by Taft-Hartley and the con-
struction industry's inclusion in the law's coverage arose in the
area of secondary boycotts. The logic of the primary-secondary
distinction, which precludes concerted activity against a neutral
employer in order to put indirect pressure on a primary employer,
falls apart in the construction industry context. This was most
clearly illustrated in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction
Trades Council.73
In Denver Building Trades, a district council of unions struck a
general contractor because it engaged a nonunion subcontractor
on the project in question. The union claimed that if had a pri-
mary dispute with the general contractor since it had determined
to retain the nonunion subcontractor. The Court held that the
real dispute was with the nonunion subcontractor and that "an
object" of the strike was to force the general contractor to sever
relations with the subcontractor. Accordingly, the union violated
section 8(b) (4) (A).74
Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the basic protest was
against nonunion men working on the job. Had the general con-
tractor hired the nonunion men directly, the strike would not
have been illegal. Why, therefore, should the fact that the general
contractor used the indirect employment device of a subcontract
change the result?75 The Denver Building Trades problem has





In Landrum-Grifln, the Congress finally recognized that the
construction industry needed some special legislation. The most
71. Id. at 897.
72. 270 F.2d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1959). Eventually, even the presumptive rule
was overturned. Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961).
73. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
74. Id. at 686-88.
75. Id. at 692-93.
76. See e.g., NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Pipefltters, Local 638, 429 U.S.
507 (1977).
77. Officially, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1976), amending NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§§151-56 (1976).
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important feature of relevance here was Landrum-Griffin's inclu-
sion of section 8(f) which allowed the prehire agreement.78
Employers need to know their labor costs in order to accurately
bid on projects. Yet at the time of bidding, they may not have any
employees. Prior to the enactment of section 8(f), an agreement
between an employer and a union prior to the hiring of any em-
ployees would have been illegal.7 9 Section 8(f) solved this prob-
lem and others by providing in pertinent part that:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsection (a) and (b) of
this section for an employer... in the ... construction industry to make
an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employ-
ment, will be engaged) in the building. . . industry with a labor organiza-
tion of which . . . construction employees are members ... because
(1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been estab-
lished under ... section 9 prior to the making of such an agreement, or
(2) such agreement requires ... membership in such labor organization
after the seventh day ... of such employment, or (3) such agreement re-
quires the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for
employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization an op-
portunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such
agreement specifies minimum training ... 80
A second area in which Landrum-Griffin accommodated the
construction industry was in regard to hot cargo agreements. The
hot cargo agreement was one in which an employer agreed not to
handle certain goods, generally those not manufactured under a
union contract.81 When Congress outlawed them by adding sec-
tion 8(e), the construction industry was exempted.
In summary, the application of the NLRA to the construction in-
dustry has had three stages: laissez faire under the Wagner Act,
total regulation under Taft-Hartley, and accommodation with the
passage of Landrum-Griffm. The question to be examined now is
the extent to which the Board and the Supreme Court have ac-
cepted the concept of special accommodation for the needs of the
construction industry.
RECENT CASE LAW
The answer to the question raised at the end of the previous
section can be found in three cases. Each of these cases presents
78. 29 U.S.C. §158(f) (1976).
79. See §§8(a) (1) & (3) and 8(b) (1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
80. 29 U.S.C. 1158(f) (1976).
81. This kind of agreement was prevalent in the trucking industry where the
teamsters used them to force neutral employers to assist them in their organizing
campaigns. See generally Aaron, supra note 53, at 1116-21.
the organizational and representational problems that are unique
to the construction industry.
Higdon
Because the employment relationship in construction is transi-
tory, representation elections are inappropriate; and the prehire
agreement has, instead, been authorized. At first, the Board
treated the prehire agreement as it would any collective bargain-
ing agreement entered into between a certified bargaining repre-
sentative and an employer. In Oilfield Maintenance Co.,82 for
example, an employer 83 tried to defend unfair labor practice
charges filed against it arising from its unilateral abrogation of
certain prehire agreements it had with several unions by ques-
tioning the unions' majority status. During the pendency of the
proceedings, all but one of the collective bargaining agreements
expired. The Board did not issue a bargaining order where the
agreements had expired and where the union clearly did not rep-
resent a majority of the employees in the unit. The Board, how-
ever, did find that section 8(f) validated the unexpired agreement
and made it enforceable until its expiration date despite the fact
that the union lacked majority status.8 4
That position was suddenly reversed by the Board in the case
of R.J. Smith Construction Co. 85 Beginning in 1964, Smith and the
operating engineers had entered into memorandum agreements
incorporating the terms of a master collective bargaining agree-
ment negotiated by an organization of contractors and a multi-
union bargaining organization.8 6 During the pendency of the then
current agreement, Smith unilaterally changed the rates that it
had been paying some of its operating engineers. Though the
union had ignored Smith's past failure to pay the wages required
under the agreements, it chose to file unfair labor practice
82. 142 NLRB Dec. 1384 (1963).
83. There was some question raised as to whether one or two employers were
involved. The Trial Examiner found, and the Board agreed, that one was the alter
ego of the other and both were bound by either's labor contracts. Id. at 1385-87.
For a more complete discussion of the alter ego or double-breasted problem in
construction see notes 145-202 and accompanying text infra.
84. 142 NLRB Dec. at 1387.
85. 191 NLRB Dec. 693 (1971).
86. One prevalent pattern of bargaining in the construction industry is be-
tween an employers' association, such as the Association of General Contractors,
and a union or multi-union group, such as a District Council or a Trades Council.
Employers who do not authorize the multi-employer organization to bargain for
them, often enter into simple agreements, known as memorandum agreements,
that adopt the provisions of the multi-employer collective bargaining agreement.
See generally Mills, Construction, supra note 7, at 57-77.
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charges based on new violations.
87
Smith defended the charges by questioning the union's major-
ity status. The union contended that section 8(f) validated the
agreement in the absence of any showing that it represented a
majority of the employees. In fact, prehire agreements are valid
in the absence of any employees. Therefore, the union argued,
the employer could not defend an unfair labor practice charge by
questioning the union's majority status.88
Relying in part on the fact that an 8(f) agreement would not bar
a representation election,89 the Board held that the employer
could raise the question of the union's majority status by refusing
to bargain. The Board reasoned that since the 8(f) agreement
could be executed before any employees were hired, there was no
reason to give the union any irrebutable presumption of majority
status.90 Since it was conceded that the operating engineers did
not represent a majority of the employees, the charges could not
be sustained.
Members Fanning and Brown dissented.91 They argued that
since a prehire agreement was valid without a majority showing,
it would be anomalous to allow the employer to question the
union's majority status when the union sought to enforce the
agreement. In essence, the Board was saying that "Congress per-
mitted such prehire contracts without intending them to have any
effect."
9 2
The D.C. Circuit refused to enforce the Board's decision in Lo-
cal No. 150, Internat'l Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB (R.J.
Smith).93 The court found section 8(f) to have been enacted in
light of the special needs of the construction industry such that "a
construction company typically hires a union before commencing
a particular project and before hiring any individual employee in
87. The union also filed §8(a) (3) charges based on the firing of several union
members. Perhaps the firing prompted the union to take the matter of contract
compliance more seriously, 191 NLRB Dec. at 693.
88. 191 NLRB Dec. at 693-94.
89. The final proviso to §8(f) states: "[Amny agreement which would be inva-
lid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursu-
ant to section 9(c) or 9(e)."
90. The Board did suggest that the presence and enforcement of a union se-
curity clause in the agreement might give the union a rebuttable presumption of
majority status. 191 NLRB Dec. at 693-94.
91. Id. at 695.
92. Id.
93. 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
the union."94 If the employer wants to question the union's ma-
jority status at any future point in time, it would be free to do so
by petitioning for an election; the one year waiting period set by
section 9(c) (3) does not apply to 8(f) agreements. 95 Similarly, the
employees may at any time petition for an election.96 Thus, ar-
gued the court, the employer has no justification for challenging
the union's majority status by refusing to bargain and prompting
an unfair labor practice charge. Echoing the dissenters on the
Board, the court stated: "we cannot conceive of such an exercise
in futility on the part of Congress as to validate a contract with a
union having minority status, but to permit its abrogation because
of the union's minority status."97
On remand, the Board indicated that it would abide by the cir-
cuit court's decision in the case before it, but it stated that it
would not follow the D.C. Circuit's ruling in future cases.9 8 The
Board got its opportunity to reaffirm its R.J. Smith holding in Hig-
don Contracting Co. 99
Higdon Construction Company and the iron workers had en-
tered into a contract, negotiated pursuant to section 8(f), in 1958.
That agreement expired, and the union refused to refer workers
to Higdon Construction until it agreed to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement that the union had negotiated with an em-
ployers' association. Higdon Construction agreed. But shortly
thereafter, the sole owner of Higdon Construction incorporated
Higdon Contracting Co. to perform work outside of the union con-
tract.100
When Higdon Contracting refused to extend the terms of Hig-
don Construction's collective bargaining agreement to its projects,
94. Id. at 1189.
95. See note 89 supra.
96. Id.
97. 480 F.2d at 1190.
98. 208 NLRB Dec. 615 (1974). The Board also determined that the appropriate
bargaining unit would be employer-wide. At the time, the company had construc-
tion underway in fourteen different counties. This decision is ironic given later
holdings on the unit question. See notes 129-34 and accompanying text infra.
99. 216 NLRB Dec. 45 (1975). For additional background on Higdon and dis-
cussion of its implications, see generally Barr & Jacobsen, The Enforceability of
Construction Industry Prehire Agreements After Higdon, 3 INDusmsA RELATIONS
L.J. 517 (1979); King & Lavaute, Current Trends in Construction Industry Labor Re-
lations-The Double-Breasted Contractor and the Prehire Contract, 29 Syn. L.
901 (1978); Comment, The NLRA's Forbidden Fruit: Valid but Unenforceable Con-
cessions to the Construction Industry, 47 CrN. L.R. 288 (1978); Comment An Exam-
ination of Section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 24 Vni. L.R 931 (1978-
79).
100. 216 NLRB Dec. 45 (1975).
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the union picketed.'01 Higdon Contracting waited until thirty
days had elapsed, and, when no election petition had been filed, it
went to the Board with section 8(b) (7)(C)102 charges.
The Board cited its decision in R.J. Smith for the proposition
that section 8(f) only establishes the legality of the prehire agree-
ment and that an employer can ignore the agreement without vio-
lating sections 8(a) (5)103 or 8(d)104 when the union does not
represent a majority of its employees.105 Ruttman Construction
Co. ,106 decided the same day as R.J. Smith, was cited for the prop-
osition that further action was necessary for a prehire agreement
to blossom into a full collective bargaining relationship.OI
These cases established that Higdon was free to ignore the sec-
tion 8(f) agreement for the projects not yet underway, and the
union could not get a section 8(a) (5> bargaining order. If the
union was not entitled to a bargaining order, it could not force
bargaining by picketing in contravention of section 8(b) (7). To al-
low such picketing, reasoned the Board, would be to allow the
union to get by indirection what it could not get directly.108 In
reaching that conclusion, the Board disagreed with the adminis-
trative law judge who had found that the picketing had been for
the purpose of enforcing a valid contract and therefore not an
8(b) (7) violation.109 In rejecting this finding, the Board deter-
mined that the prehire agreement was without meaning where
the union had not achieved majority status at a project.
Not surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit reversed and let the Board
know that it was unhappy about the Board's ignoring the court's
decision in Local 150 (R.J. Smith).11o The court viewed the issue
as simply whether an employer could walk away from a valid
101. The Administrative Law Judge found that the two companies were alter
egos. Id. See notes 145-202 and accompanying text infra.
102. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 216 NLRB Dec. at 46.
106. 191 NLRB Dec. 701 (1971).
107. 216 NLRB Dec. at 46.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 49-50. The Administrative Law Judge did not mince words when he
found that the employer "only" sought to avoid the contract on nonunion jobs "by
subterfuge and chicanery." Id. at 50.
110. Local Union No. 103, etc. v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Court
called attention to the fact that the NLRB had neither appealed Local 150 nor re-
quested a hearing en bane. Id. at 88.
agreement without any consequences. The court reaffirmed its
position in Local 150 (R.J. Smith) that an employer could either
abide by the prehire agreement, or, if it was troubled by the
union's lack of majority status, petition for an election."'
The Supreme Court reversed in a six to three decision in NLRB
v. Local 103, Ironworkers (Higdon).12 Justice White, writing for
the majority, found that the Board's construction of the Act was
"reasonable" and "acceptable" albeit not the only "tenable read-
ing.""13 Justice White spoke about the general statutory policy of
giving representational rights to a union that was the "voice of the
majority."1' 4 Since section 8(f) was an exception to this rule and
would not bar an election to determine majority status, the em-
ployer could condition its obligation to bargain and to honor the
prehire agreement "on the union's [attainment of a majority] at
the various construction sites."n 5
White cited the legislative history of section 8(b) (7) in support
of this conclusion: "[I] ts major purpose was to implement one of
the Act's principal goals-to ensure that employees were free to
make an uncoerced choice of bargaining agent."" 6 White ac-
knowledged that section 8(f) "was motivated by... the unique
situation in [the construction] industry," but stated that "Con-
gressional concern about coerced designations ... did not evapo-
rate" when Congress acted in regard to the situation in the
construction industry."?7 He maintained that section 8(f) was
prompted by the contractor's need to know labor costs when bid-
ding and its need to be ensured of access to adequate amounts of
skilled labor. White mentioned that representation elections to
demonstrate majority status were not feasible in construction.
But he concluded that the Board's determination that section
111. Id. at 90.
112. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
113. Id. at 341. Throughout the opinion, the Court accepts the Board's holding
with language that evinces a reluctance to embrace the holding. Perhaps the
Court is unhappy about the decision but feels compelled to abide by it for institu-
tional reasons. It is equally possible, however, that the Court is just being defen-
sive because it recognizes that its arguments don't quite bear up to any scrutiny.
114. Id. at 344.
115. Id. at 345.
116. Id. at 346. White also cited Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1974), for the proposition that one of the
main purposes of Landrum-Griflln "was to limit 'top down' organizing campaigns."
NLRB v. Local 103, Ironworkers, 434 U.S. 335, 346 (1978). The Court's reference to
Connell and its quotation of its conclusion in Connell that a major aim of Lan-
drum-Griffin was to limit top down organizing is disingenuous. Connell did not in-
volve section 8(f) of the NLRA. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text infra. It
was thus easy for the Court to ignore the fact that section 8(f), a top down organi-
zation tool, was enacted as a part of Landrum-Griffhn
117. Id. at 347-48.
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8(b) (7) applies to a "minority union picketing to enforce a prehire
contract" (so as to ensure uncoerced employee selection) could
not be faulted.11 8
The Court dealt with the argument that section 8(1) is rendered
meaningless if unenforceable, in part, by citing NLRB v. Enter-
prise Association of Pipefitters, Local 638 (Enterprise) 119 and Lo-
cal 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand
Door) .120 In Sand Door, picketing to enforce a valid hot cargo
was prohibited. Similarly, in Enterprise, the Court upheld a sec-
ondary boycott charge where the union picketed to enforce a valid
work preservation agreement. It was also argued that the prehire
agreement was not meaningless because the employer could vol-
untarily abide by it. Finally, the opinion stated that "[i] t is also
undisputed that when the union successfully seeks majority sup-
port, the prehire agreement attains the status of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement .... ,,121
Justice Stewart wrote a brief dissenting opinion which was
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.122 He agreed that the
employer in the construction industry was free to choose whether
to enter into a prehire agreement and could not be compelled or
coerced into signing one, but he found nothing in the legislative
history of section 8 (f) to support the proposition that an employer
could render a collective bargaining agreement a "nullity." 2
3
Even assuming that the Board was correct in concluding that a
prehire agreement would not support a bargaining order, he also
disagreed with the conclusion that the picketing here violated
section 8(b) (7). Primary picketing is nbt unlawful unless it falls
within a specific statutory prohibition. Prior cases had inter-
preted section 8(b) (7) as applying only where a union was seek-
ing an initial bargaining relationship.12 4 If nothing else, the
prehire agreement meant that the parties had passed the initial
bargaining relationship stage.
Little can be said in support of the Court's position in this case.
118. Id. at 348-49. Note again the Court's language which fails to endorse the
Board's holding but does not overrule the Board.
119. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
120. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
121. Id. at 349-50.
122. Id. at 352.
123. Id. at 353.
124. Id. at 354.
It seems to directly contradict its stated ends, and it ignores the
realities of the construction industry. The decision also raises
some questions with regard to the appropriate unit for bargaining
that the Court does not even consider.
Employee Choice and Elections
The Court clearly states that it is upholding the Board's inter-
pretation of section 8(b) (7) and section 8(f) so as to effectuate a
"major purpose" and "principal goal" of Congress--'o ensure
that employees were free to make an uncoerced choice of bargain-
ing agent." 125 But the Court never suggests how the employees
may exercise that free choice. In the standard industrial setting,
the election procedure can be effective. But in the construction
industry, elections cannot work.
Senator Kennedy, who led the Senate drive for labor legislation
in 1959, stated quite clearly that section 8(f) was needed "because
of the inability to conduct representation elections in the con-
struction industry."'126 The Court notes that the Senate report on
section 8(f) found that representation elections were not feasible
in a large section of the industry due to short periods of employ-
ment by a worker with any given employer,127 but then the Court
ignores the problem and turns the issue upside down, stating
that: "Privileging ... prehire agreements in an effort to accom-
modate the special circumstances in the construction industry
may have greatly convenienced unions and employers, but in no
sense can it be portrayed as an expression of the employees' or-
ganizational wishes."128
This is absurd reasoning. First it forgets that section 8(f) exists
because employees have no opportunity to express organizational
wishes. Second, it assumes that the desires of the union are to-
tally divorced from the interests of the workers. Notwithstanding
the existence of corrupt unions, most unions are composed of and
run by workers, or workers' employees, for the benefit of workers.
Third, it results in the choice going to the employers, whose inter-
ests are directly contrary to those of the employees: no employer
abandons a union agreement in order to be free to pay workers
more money. It may be true that the prehire agreement or the
union shop is not necessarily the choice of employees, but there
125. Id. at 346.
126. 104 CONG. REC. 11308 (remarks of Senator Kennedy). Quoted with ap-
proval in the House, 105 CONG. REc. 16630 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1959).
127. 434 U.S. at 349.
128. Id.
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is no evidence that the open shop and lower wages are what em-
ployees would prefer.
The Appropriate Unit
A second problem raised by the Higdon decisions and one that
will help determine the ultimate impact of these decisions on la-
bor relations in the construction industry is the unit question.
Must the union demonstrate majority status at each site or on a
company wide basis?
In Daniel Construction Co.,129 decided in 1961, the Board held
that a company wide unit was appropriate even though the em-
ployer was engaged in construction in a six-state area. The Board
found that the "working conditions, skills, and nature of employ-
ment" were similar at all sites. 30 The employer argued for a unit
limited to a specific project. The Board rejected this request stat-
ing.
While many of the Employer's projects may be under construction for 18
months or longer, a great number of these are of much shorter duration.
To recognize the Employer's contention and direct an election only in a
single-project unit would in many instances be a meaningless ritual and
serve no useful purpose.
131
In a case decided just before the Supreme Court's decision in
Local 103 (Higdon) that position was apparently abandoned. In
Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc.-32 the union challenged the em-
ployer's decision not to abide by a prehire agreement when it
commenced work at a new site. The Board reiterated its Higdon
view that prehire agreements carry no presumption of majority
status and stated: "the mere fact that the Union might indeed
have represented a majority of the employees at Respondent Dee
Cee's previous jobsites is of no consequence inasmuch as the
Union must demonstrate its majority at each new jobsite in order
to invoke the provisions of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act." 3 3 This po-
sition was thereafter acknowledged in Local 103 (Higdon) when
the Supreme Court said that the duty to bargain was "contingent
on the union's attaining majority support at the various construc-
tion sites."'134
129. 133 NLRB Dec. 264 (1961).
130. Id. at 265.
131. Id.
132. 232 NLRB Dec. 421 (1977).
133. Id. at 422.
134. 434 U.S. 335, 344 (1978).
If this position is maintained, the unions in construction will
face the "meaningless ritual" that the Board rejected in Daniel
Construction. There is no way that a union will be able to mount
an organizational campaign at each construction site. Nor does
the union have any leverage with the employer at a site where the
employer wants to operate nonunion-the employer would not
decide to operate nonunion unless it knew that it could get suffi-
cient labor without the union. The union's leverage exists and its
basic bargain is struck when it offers to supply labor in return for
its labor being used at all of the contractor's present or potential
sites. The decisions in Local 103 (Higdon) and Dee Cee take
away the package deal.
It is also unrealistic to speak about the need to demonstrate a
majority at each new site when one realizes that the section 8(f)
prehire agreement was designed to allow for a union contract
where no employees had been hired at all. If section 8(f) permits
an employer with no current employees to agree to a contract cov-
ering all future employees at all future sites, there is no rationale
for allowing the employer to justify an abandonment of the agree-
ment because the union cannot demonstrate a majority at each
site.
Majority Status and Previous Bargaining Relationship
The Higdon decisions leave open questions as to how a union
may demonstrate majority status and what constitutes an 8(f)
agreement. Resolution of these issues may also determine the ul-
timate effect that the Higdon decisions will have on the industry.
In Bricklayers & Masons Local 3135 the Board distinguished be-
tween an initial bargaining relationship and a situation where the
parties had previously executed collective bargaining agreements.
According to the Board, section 8(f) only applied to initial at-
tempts to establish a relationship. This view was followed in Dal-
las Building & Construction Trades Council 3 6 where successive
prehire agreements were treated as full-fledged collective bar-
gaining agreements.
In Haberman Construction Co.,137 decided after Higdon, the
Board reaffirmed this distinction in a rather striking situation. In
Haberman, the employer hired union employees (though not al-
ways through the union hiring hall) and paid union wage rates
and benefits from 1973 on, although it never negotiated with the
135. 162 NLRB Dec. 476 (1966).
136. 164 NLRB Dec. 938 (1967).
137. 236 NLRB Dec. 79 (1978).
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union or signed a union agreement.138 In 1977 the employer de-
cided to go open shop and stop paying union rates. The employer
argued, of course, that no contract existed; but it also maintained
that if one did exist, it was a prehire agreement, and that the
union needed to prove that it represented a majority of the em-
ployees. 3 9 The administrative law judge found, however, that if
there was a contract (and one was found), it was adopted in 1973
and there would be an "established relationship" between the
parties so as to make section 8(f) inapplicable.140
The decisions in these three cases would be encouraging if they
could be relied upon. Unfortunately, the decisions in Higdon
seem to go against any such distinction based on prior bargaining
history. Although the precise argument was not discussed by the
Supreme Court, it rejected an argument that section 8(b) (7) was
inapplicable because the union was not seeking initial accept-
ance.1 4 1 Further clarification on this question will be needed.
As to how a union might prove majority status, there are sev-
eral possibilities.142 Certification through the election procedure
remains a possibility in some circumstances. More promising is
the possibility that a union security clause, that has been en-
forced, will give the union some presumption of majority status.
Such a result was intimated in R.J. Smith 143 and adopted by the
Supreme Court in Local 103 (Higdon): "One-time majority sta-
tus, coupled with a union security clause that has been enforced,
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of continued majority sta-
tus.,,144
The problem with elections, however, is that they will only be
possible in rare situations. Also, if the appropriate unit is the in-
dividual site, elections will not be worth the effort even when pos-
sible. The presumption of majority status, if rebuttable, is equally
inadequate if a site by site determination is required. If the em-
ployer is allowed to ignore an 8(f) agreement and it hires nonun-
ion workers at a new site, it can easily defeat the presumption.
138. Id. at 81.
139. Id. at 83.
140. Id.
141. See Stewart's dissenting opinion, 434 U.S. at 354 and the opinion of the
Court, 434 U.S. at 351-52.
142. An excellent discussion on the possibilities left open to the unions after
Higdon is contained in Barr & Jacobsen, supra note 99, at 526-34.
143. 191 NLRB Dec. 693, 695 n.8 (1971).
144. 434 U.S. at 351 n.12.
Only a rule giving an irrebuttable presumption based on past
projects can serve to avoid the problem of giving the employer a
means to justify its own actions.
As it now stands, the employer's position is strong, although
one could conceive of unions using the Higdon decisions offen-
sively. Suppose, for example, that Higdon bid on a job in a union
area and needed a prehire agreement in order to get workers and
calculate labor costs. The union agrees to a certain rate and Hig-
don submits a bid based on that rate. What would prevent the
union from thereafter repudiating the contract and demanding
more in wages before employees are referred to the job?
But the possibility that Higdon will lead to industrial warfare is
not the main reason that it is to be condemned. The problem that
the Court and the Board never face is how the employee is sup-
posed to be given a voice or an opportunity to express an un-
coerced choice in representation. That is the stated justification
for the holdings, but the result of the decision is to sanction, if not
encourage, the employers to follow their own desires.
Peter Kiewit
In recent years, contractors have used the device of the double-
breasted company in order to avoid the burdens of a union agree-
ment. A double-breasted company is one which has two separate
corporate identities--one will operate under a union agreement,
the other will be an open shop.145 Both companies will be owned,
controlled and/or managed by the same interests and the deci-
sion as to which company will bid on a project will be determined
by whether the project will be union or not.
Since employees in a construction company are hired on a pro-
ject by project basis, it is quite easy to maintain a second corpo-
rate shell. Both companies can use the same equipment, share
office space and divide the cost of ancillary services. Independent
identities can easily be maintained through careful bookkeeping.
From the contractor's point of view, the double-breasted com-
pany is extremely advantageous. No work need be turned away
because it requires or prohibits the use of union labor. The con-
tractor can compete in both markets. From the union's (and em-
ployees') point of view, the double-breasted operation is a
nightmare. Organizing a contractor will not help to organize the
145. See generally Bornstein, The Emerging Law of the "Double Breasted" Oper-
ation in the Construction Industry, 28 LABOR L.Jo 77 (1977); King & Lavaute, supra
note 99; Note, Dual Companies-When Does a Union Have the Right to Expanded
Representation, 12 U. SAN FRANcisco LT. 89 (1977).
[voL. 18: 583, 1981] Union Representation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
market. On the contrary, it allows the expansion of the open shop
sector.
In South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, International
Union of Operating Engineers (Kiewit)146 the Supreme Court
finally reviewed the Board's position on the legal issues raised by
the use of the double-breasted company in construction. The de-
cisions of the Board and the Court fail to take the structure and
needs of the industry into consideration, and their decisions will
have significant consequences for labor relations in the industry.
Once again, the interests of the employees are alleged to justify
the results, but in fact, the decisions only serve the employers to
the ultimate detriment of employees and their free choice.
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. (Peter Kiewit), a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of Peter Kiewit Sons' Inc. (Kiewit Inc.), had been engaged in
highway construction in Oklahoma since at least 1960.147 During
that time, it had entered into various collective bargaining agree-
ments with Local 627 of the Operating Engineers. 48 When the
parties were in the process of negotiating an agreement to cover
the 1970-73 period, the area manager for Peter Kiewit told the
union that unless the union could sign up more contractors, Peter
Kiewit could not remain competitive with other contractors, and it
would be forced to cease doing business in Oklahoma49 At that
time, Peter Kiewit was the only union contractor doing highway
construction in the state.5 0
Kiewit Inc. thereafter decided to have South Prairie Construc-
tion Co., another wholly owned subsidiary, come into Oklahoma
and compete for highway construction work on an open shop ba-
sis. South Prairie had been active as an open shop contractor in
other states.'51 South Prairie and Peter Kiewit did not bid against
each other on any projects but South Prairie did bid on and re-
ceive awards for projects that Peter Kiewit could have per-
formed.152
The union complained to Peter Kiewit, stating that the use of
146. 425 U.S. 800 (1975).
147. 206 NLRB Dec. 562, 563-64 (1973). All facts are taken from the decision of
the administrative law judge.
148. Id. at 563.
149. Id. at 564.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 565-66.
South Prairie was an attempt to undermine the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The union also wrote to the president of South
Prairie, the former area manager of Peter Kiewit, claiming that
South Prairie and Peter Kiewit were one employer within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act and that the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Pe-
ter Kiewit should be applied to South Prairie.153 South Prairie
maintained its position that it was going to operate open shop, so
Local 627 filed charges under sections 8(a) (1) and (5).154
The administrative law judge found that South Prairie had
taken over the facilities formerly occupied by Peter Kiewit, that
South Prairie's supervisory and office staffs had previously been
employed by Peter Kiewit, and that the president of South Prairie
had been the area manager for Peter Kiewit.155 In addition, she
found that when supervisory personnel were without work at Pe-
ter Kiewit, South Prairie was informed and these people were
hired by South Prairie if it had an opening. The reverse situation
had not occurred, but the president of South Prairie testified that
transfers of supervisory personnel from South Prairie to Peter
Kiewit could occur if the need arose.156
Equipment was freely interchanged between the companies.
South Prairie maintained a list of available Peter Kiewit equip-
ment. Rental charges were imposed, but, owing to the fact that
the companies were both wholly owned subsidiaries of Kiewit,
Inc., the rental charges were little more than paper transac-
tions.157
Employees who performed construction work were hired by
both companies on a job by job basis. There was little evidence
that transfer of construction employees had taken place.15 8 Labor
policy for Peter Kiewit was set by Kiewit, Inc. South Prairie's la-
bor policy was set by its own Board of Directors, but these direc-
tors received instructions from Kiewit, Inc.159 The employees of
South Prairie received an average of $0.50 to $1.00 per hour less
than the employees of Peter Kiewit, and South Prairie's employ-
ees did not receive any health or welfare benefits.160
On these facts, the administrative law judge found that South
153. Id.
154. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
155. 206 NLRB Dec. at 566-67.
156. Id. at 567.
157. Id. at 567-68.
158. Id. at 567. But there were some cases of employee interchange. In one in-
stance, a Peter Kiewit employee worked for South Prairie at full salary, which was
paid by Peter Kiewit. Id. at 568.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 567.
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Prairie was brought in to maximize the profits of Kiewit, Inc. by
operating in Oklahoma without the burden of a union contract.
Work performed by South Prairie's employees was work that
would have been performed by Peter Kiewit's employees under
the union agreement.161 The administrative law judge stated:
Where, as here, a particular legal entity has participated in or has been
used as a means of circumventing a statutory duty imposed on an at least
nominally separate entity, cases ... have held both entities answerable
for an unfair labor practice .... While the ... liability is usually
couched in terms of a finding that the nominally separate entities occupy
single-employer status, or that one is the alter ego or successor of the
other, liability may be imposed without selecting any of these labels.
162
Without applying any such label, the administrative law judge
found violations of sections 8(a) (1) and (5).163
The Board disagreed with the administrative law judge and dis-
missed the charges.164 The Board noted the practice in the con-
struction industry of operating separate union and nonunion
companies and cited cases where it had failed to require the non-
union company to adhere to the union agreement.165 The Board
also cited previous decisions where it had refused to include the
employees of the union and nonunion companies in the same bar-
gaining unit.166
The issue, according to the Board, was whether the two compa-
nies constituted a single employer. A "critical factor" in making
such a determination was the "degree of common control of labor
relations policies," which control had to be "actual" or "active"
rather than "potential."167 Here, the Board found that South Prai-
rie determined its own labor policies and that it had operated in-
dependently. Accordingly, the Board found that South Prairie
and Peter Kiewit were separate employers and that the employ-
ees of each constituted a separate bargaining unit.168 With that
finding, it was not improper for South Prairie to refuse to abide by
Peter Kiewit's collective bargaining agreement with Local 627.
The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the Board and vacated its deci-
161. Id. at 571-72.
162. Id. at 573.
163. Id. at 575.
164. Id. at 562-63.
165. Id. at 562, citing Gerace Construction Inc., 193 NLRB Dec. 645 (1971) and
Frank N. Smith Assoc., Inc., 194 NLRB Dec. 212 (1971).
166. Id., citing Central New Mexico Chapter, National Electrical Contractors'
Ass'n., 152 NLRB Dec. 1604 (1965).
167. Id., quoting from Gerace Construction Inc., 193 NLRB Dec. at 645.
168. Id. at 562-63.
sion.169 On the single employer question, the court found that
under prior case law, the controlling criteria were "interrelation of
operations, common management, centralized control of labor re-
lations and common ownership." 7 0 The single employer determi-
nation should be based on all of the circumstances; not all of the
controlling criteria need be found in order to make a single em-
ployer determination.171 The court of appeals also pointed to the
importance of seeing whether there was an "arm's length" rela-
tionship between the two companies, such as there would be with
nonrelated entities.172
The court did not feel that the degree of common control over
labor policies was the critical factor in the sense of it being the
"sine qua non of 'single employer status."'173 It was merely one
of the controlling criteria. Moreover, the fact that Kiewit, Inc. de-
termined that South Prairie would operate in Oklahoma on a non-
union basis constituted a "very substantial qualitative degree of
centralized control of labor relations."174
The court reviewed some of the ways in which Peter Kiewit and
South Prairie were related and used each other's presence to
their mutual benefit. It found that such an "interrelationship of
operations and common management. . . would not be found in
[an] arm's length relationship existing among unintegrated com-
panies."175 The court therefore held that Peter Kiewit and South
Prairie were a single employer for the purposes of the NLRA.176
In addition, the circuit court held that the employees of both com-
panies would constitute an appropriate unit for collective bargain-
ing.177
The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion.178 The
Court viewed the case as containing two separate questions. One
involved whether Peter Kiewit and South Prairie were a single
169. Local No. 627, International Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 518
F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1975). One circuit court judge dissented, finding that the differ-
ence between the court's determination and the Board's was merely factual; both
the court and the Board were in accord as to the appropriate legal standard to be
applied. Circuit Court Judge Tamms felt, therefore, that the court should defer to
the agency charged with the principal responsibility for administering the labor
laws. Id. at 1050 (Tamms, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1045.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1046.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1047.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1048. The court backed into this conclusion stating that the Board
had given no indication that with a single employer finding it would have dis-
agreed with the determination of the Administrative Law Judge.
178. South Prairie Constr. v. Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
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employer within the meaning of the Act. The second and distinct
question was whether the employees of both companies consti-
tuted the appropriate bargaining unit, given a holding on the first
question that the companies were a single employer. According
to the Court, the circuit court's allegedly improper determination
of the unit question was the main contention of the petitioners.179
The Supreme Court reluctantly affirmed the circuit court's de-
termination on the single employer question.180 But the circuit
court was reversed on its unit determination. The Supreme Court
did not believe that the Board had addressed that question in the
context of a single employer determination. Previous Board deci-
sions had not made the single employer finding determinative of
the unit question.181 Since the selection of an appropriate unit
was largely within the Board's discretion, the circuit court erred
in not sending the question back to the Board for a decision in
light of the circuit court's single employer determination.182 The
Supreme Court also made specific reference to the fact that
Board determinations on unit questions, while not final, "should
rarely be disturbed."183 The message to the circuit court was
clear.
As might be expected, the Board on remand found that South
Prairie's employees constituted a separate, appropriate bargain-
ing unit.184 According to the Board, different questions were
raised by the single employer and appropriate unit questions. In
the single employer inquiry, the ownership, structure and inte-
grated control of the companies were at issue. In the unit ques-
tion, the concern was the "community of interest of the
employees."185
The factors to be considered on the unit question in order to de-
termine the community of interest were:
the bargaining history; the functional integration of the operations; the dif-
ferences in the types of work and the skills of the employees; the extent of
centralization of management and supervision, particularly in regard to la-
bor relations, hiring, discipline, and control of day-to-day operations; and
179. Id. at 803. This is probably correct since the single employer finding would
be irrelevant to the petitioners if the Board or the Court were to decide in its favor
on the unit question.
180. Id. at 803-04, see especially note 5.
181. Id. at 805.
182. Id. at 805-06.
183. Id. at 805.
184. 231 NLRB Dec. 76, 95 LR.R.MvL 1510 (1977).
185. Id. at 77, 95 LMRRM. at 1511.
the extent of interchange and contact between the groups of employ-
ees.
18 6
Though the circuit court had found the operations of the two
companies to be interrelated, the Board found that with respect
to the employees, the companies were substantially separate.
While both companies engaged in road construction, Peter Kiewit
also performed airport, mill and bridge construction. From that
fact, the Board concluded that the interests of South Prairie's em-
ployees were "more narrowly drawn."187 As for control of labor
relations, the Board found that from the employees' perspective,
the day-to-day control exercised by each company over its own
employees was more significant than any common control at the
corporate level. 88
The circuit court affirmed.l8 9 The court was careful to note that
it could not substitute its judgment for that of the Board. The
Board's determination of the unit question could only be over-
turned if it was "arbitrary and unreasonable."'90 All that the
Board needs to do is choose an appropriate unit.
The union tried to argue that a single employer determination
necessitated the finding of an employer wide unit determination.
The circuit court dismissed that argument because Board prece-
dent to the contrary had been cited with approval by the Supreme
Court in its related decision.191 The circuit court also dismissed
the contention that the Board's decision was inconsistent with the
Board's own precedent. The Board's decision here could be ex-
plained by reference to factual differences sufficient to justify
their contrary conclusions. 192
The potential impact of the Kiewit decisions cannot be -under-
stated. Since elections are not feasible to demonstrate employee
preference in the industry, the employees depend on unions to
secure agreements with contractors. Under the Kiewit decisions,
the employers can now make a unilateral decision whether to op-
erate under a union agreement on a project by project basis, with
no regard given to the desires of employees. Where Higdon se-
verely curtailed the enforceability of the prehire agreement, the
Kiewit decisions have given employers a back door exit from
agreements that are, in principle, fully enforceable.
186. Id.
187. Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1512.
188. Id.
189. Local 627, Int'l Union, etc. v. NLRB Dec., 595 F.2d 845, 100 LR.IM. 2792
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
190. Id. at 848, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2795.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 850, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2796.
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What is most disturbing about the treatment of the double-
breasted issue is that the result is not compelled by statute.
Rather, the Board and the Supreme Court are applying flexible
standards in a way that approves a practice that is clearly con-
trary to the spirit of the Act.
Since the Board was reversed on the single employer question
and since the single employer holding will not necessarily result
in an extension of the contract, the Board's view on the single em-
ployer question does not warrant extensive comment here, but it
has been subject to criticism.193 The Board's emphasis on "actual
control" of labor relations'9 4 merely requires that the potential
double-breasted contractor designate certain individuals as being
in charge. Surely, the Board should show a little more concern as
to the substance or reality of the situation. Here, the first opinion
of the circuit court makes more sense. In essence, the circuit
court said that form is irrelevant: if you claim to be separate, act
towards each other at "arm's length," i.e., as truly separate organi-
zations would.195
On the unit question the absurdity of the Board's decision is
most obvious. The standard enunciated by the Board is the com-
munity of interest of the employees. Yet the interests of the em-
ployees have nothing to do with the results reached.
For example, one test of the common interests of the employees
is the differences in labor relations.196 Yet, as has been pointed
out:
To ignore the employer's motive and the context in which these cases
arise in analyzing them from a unit standpoint is to engage in a totally
frivolous exercise. To rely on the differing labor relations (union versus
nonunion) in deciding the unit issue, begs the very question to be decided
and ignores the improper employer motivation in the first instance.
1 9 7
The union here is saying that South Prairie should be operating
under a union agreement. The Board says no because South
Prairie is not operating under a union agreement.
The Board is equally blind in its application of the factor re-
garding differences in the work of the two companies and the
skills of the employees of each. The Board acknowledges that
there is nothing to indicate a significant difference between the
193. See King & Lavaute, supra note 99, at 905-15.
194. 206 NLRB Dec. at 562.
195. 518 F.2d 1040, 1046-47.
196. 231 NLRB Dec. 76, 77, 95 LR.RM. 1510, 1511 (1977).
197. King & Lavaute, supra note 99, at 921.
skills of the employees of the two companies.198 It states that be-
cause the employees of South Prairie only do highway construc-
tion (as opposed to airport, bridge and mill construction which
Peter Kiewit has done in addition to highway work), the "inter-
ests of South Prairie's employees are more narrowly drawn than
those of Kiewit's employees."' 99 But that statement is meaning-
less. Why would a machine operator care whether the product of
his or her work was a road or a runway? What would such a dif-
ference in the product of construction mean in regard to an em-
ployee's interests in collective bargaining? Just because the
Board cites a difference does not mean that it has any relevance.
The Board is correct when it points towards the difference be-
tween working for a union and nonunion employer. Here, the pay
scales were different. Other differences may exist with regard to
work rules, fringe benefits and grievance rights. But the exist-
ence of such differences should lead to an attempt to give the em-
ployee a meaningful opportunity to decide whether to work under
a union agreement or not. Instead, the Board has given that
choice to the employer.
It is shocking that the Board is allowing this result when the
employer has not even attempted to hide the fact that its purpose
is to avoid the union agreement.20o While Peter Kiewit claimed
that it could not remain competitive under the union agreement,
the facts belied that claim. Only one contractor in Oklahoma had
more work than Peter Kiewit, and Peter Kiewit contracts totalled
forty percent more than the third-ranking contractor.201
The Board in Kiewit has said: you can lie about the need to be
nonunion, you can admit that you are trying to get out of your
union agreement, and you can use the fact that you are operating
the second company nonunion to legitimate its operation as a
nonunion company. The ultimate insult is that the Board states
that it is acting "in order to assure to employees the fullest free-
dom in exercising the rights guaranteed by (the) Act."202 Once
again we have employee rhetoric and employer free choice as the
reality.
198. 231 NLRB Dec. 76, 77, 95 LRAI.M. 1510, 1512 (1977).
199. Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1512.
200. In PA. Hayes, 226 NLRB Dec. 230 (1976), the Board refused to allow an
employer to go out of business and reform so as to avoid its collective bargaining
agreement. Similarly, in Allied Mills, Inc., 218 NLRB Dec. 281 (1975) petition for
review denied, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), an at-
tempt to avoid a union agreement by closing a plant and reopening at a new loca-
tion was proscribed even where there were other legitimate business reasons for
the move.
201. 518 F.2d 1040, 1044 n.6.
202. 231 NLRB Dec. 76, 77, 95 L.R.R.M. 1510, 1511 (1977).
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Connell
As a result of the Higdon and Kiewit decisions, there are few
legal restraints on an employer's unilateral decision to operate as
an open shop contractor. The practical restraints imposed by the
need for skilled employees still exist. In addition, general union
strength in an area of the country or in a sector of the construc-
tion industry can limit or at least inhibit the spread of the open
shop movement. But it is fair to say that employers can help
themselves whenever the market allows.
In contrast, unions have been subjected to increasing regulation
which restricts the use of economic muscle. Taft-Hartley promul-
gated union unfair labor practices and proscribed the secondary
boycott.203 Landrum-Griffin curtailed organizational and recogni-
tional picketing.204 Section 8(e), which outlawed the hot cargo
agreement, was also added by Landrum-Griffin.205 The construc-
tion industry, however, received a special exemption from section
8(e).
While section 8(e) broadly proscribed any agreement by which
an employer refused to do business with another employer, the
construction industry proviso stated: "[N]othing in this subsec-
tion shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and
an employer in the construction industry relating to the con-
tracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of con-
struction ... .,"206 The legislative history of the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e) is meager, but it seems to have
been put in to permit a union to negotiate a clause preventing the
subcontracting of work to a nonunion contractor.20 7
Such clauses are needed by unions in the construction industry
because of the way that the industry operates. If a carpenters'
union has a contract with ABC Construction Co. and does not
have a union only subcontracting clause, nothing could prevent
ABC from subcontracting out its carpentry work to another con-
203. See generally §8(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
204. Section 8(b) (7) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
205. For a more complete description of the legislative history of Landrum-Grif-
fin's hot cargo clause prohibition, see Fairweather, An Evaluation of the Changes
in Taft-Hartley, 54 NORTHWESTERN U. LR 711, 726-28 (1960); Flemming, supra note
53 at 680-93; Aaron, supra note 53 at 1112-21; Goldberg & Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-
Hartley Amendments, with Emphasis on the Legislative History, 54 NORTHWEST-
ERN U. L.R. 747, 755-74.
206. 29 U.S.C. §158(e) (1976).
207. Aaron, supra note 53, at 1119.
tractor in order to avoid its collective bargaining agreement with
the carpenters. 20 8
Senator Kennedy, the floor manager of the Senate version of
Landrum-Griffin stated:
Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry
promises not to subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion
contractor appear to be legal today. They will not be unlawful under sec-
tion 8(e). The proviso is also applicable to all other agreements involving
undertakings not to do work on a construction project site with other con-
tractors or subcontractors regardless of the precise relationship between
them .... 209
A similar interpretation can be found in the report of the House
Conference Committee.210
In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
100 (Connell) ,211 the Supreme Court used a narrow interpretation
of section 8(e) and the antitrust laws to severely restrict this kind
of union self-help. Once again, employers are protected from any
need to comply with the choice of the employees insofar as such
choice is reflected by union action. Because the decision here is
activist in its regulation of labor relations, it also negates any be-
nign interpretation of Higdon and Kiewit as being a new kind of
free market approach to labor relations.
Labor and Antitrust
Because Connell involved some antitrust questions and be-
cause the labor-antitrust conflict has been especially prevalent in
the construction industry,212 a brief review of some labor-antitrust
law is necessary 213 That there is an inherent conflict between the
labor and antitrust laws is one of the few propositions in this field
that meets with unanimous agreement. The antitrust laws are
designed to favor competition. Labor unions strive to eliminate
208. Remember that Denver Building Trades prevents picketing by stranger
employees in protest of nonunion workers.
209. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at 1433 (1959).
210. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at 943 (1959).
211. 421 U.S. 616 (1974).
212. "The frequency of the alleged trade restraints in the industry may be seen
from the fact that in the thirty years before 1946, nearly one-fourth of all antitrust
cases brought up by the government involved construction in some manner." HA-
BER & LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 19.
213. For a more rigorous analysis of the history of the labor-antitrust struggle,
see Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws--a Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L,
REv. 252 (1955); Kryvoruka, A Paradigm of Labor-Antitrust Relations: Defining a
Union's Allowable Area of Economic Conflict, 11 AKRON L. REV. 59 (1977); Meltzer,
Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cm. L. REV.
659 (1965); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of An-
titrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE I.J. 14 (1963).
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competition based on wage differentials. Early decisions inter-
preting the Sherman 214 and Clayton 215 Antitrust Acts did not ac-
cord labor any special treatment.216
In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader217 the Supreme Court broke
from past precedent and held that the curtailment of competition
based on wage competition was consistent with national policy.218
United States v. Hutcheson ,219 decided shortly thereafter, recog-
nized a statutory exemption for labor based on the Norris-La-
Guardia 220 and Clayton Acts. The Supreme Court held:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and the illicit under §20 [of the Clayton Act] are not
to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of
which the particular union activities are the means.
221
An approach to the labor-antitrust conflict using the NLRA as a
touchstone of allowable activity was rejected by the Supreme
Court in the companion cases of United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington (Pennington) = and Local 189, Meatcutters v. Jewel Tea
Co. (Jewel Tea).223 In Pennington the union had agreed to im-
pose its wage settlement with the large coal companies on the
smaller companies. The Court split into three groups.
Three Justices found this to be within the "combining with non-
labor" caveat to the exemption enunciated in Hutcheson.224 They
considered but rejected an argument that because the agreement
was over a mandatory subject of bargaining, it was entitled to im-
munity. According to this group, the fact that the subject was
214. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1976)) [hereinafter
referred to as the Sherman Act].
215. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1976)) [hereinafter
referred to as the Clayton Act].
216. In fact, in Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), the
Supreme Court interpreted the Clayton Act so as to eliminate its clear labor ex-
emption.
217. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
218. "[Ain elimination of price competition based on differences in labor stan-
dards is the objective of any national labor organization. But this effect on compe-
tition has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of price competition
prohibited by the Sherman Act" Id. at 503-04.
219. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
220. 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§101-15 (1976)).
221. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
222. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
223. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
224. Justice White wrote the opinion which was joined by Justices Warren and
Brennan.
mandatory was of "great relevance" in deciding the antitrust
question, but the union had lost whatever antitrust immunity it
might have had by agreeing to impose a settlement on other bar-
gaining units.225 A group of three Justices, headed by Justice
Douglas, agreed that antitrust immunity was lost because of the
combination with non-labor but would have found liability even if
no attempt had been made to impose the settlement on other
units.226
Justice Goldberg wrote a dissenting opinion which stressed the
need for judicial restraint and deference to a congressional intent
to eschew antitrust regulation of labor activity.22 7 He argued that
the antitrust laws should not apply to collective bargaining activ-
ity covering mandatory subjects of bargaining. 228
[M]andatory subjects of bargaining are issues as to which union strikes
may not be enjoined by either federal or state courts. To say that the
union can strike over such issues but that both it and the employer are
subject to possible antitrust penalties for making collective bargaining
agreements concerning them is to assert that Congress intended to permit
the parties . .. to wage industrial warfare but to prohibit them from
peacefully settling their disputes. This would not only-be irrational, but
would fly in the face of clear congressional intent .... 229
He also noted that the combination with non-labor language was
senseless because unions could never achieve any of their goals
unilaterally.230
In Jewel Tea the dispute involved a provision in an agreement
which restricted the marketing hours for meat. The opinion of the
Court stated the issue as:
[W]hether the marketing-hours restriction, like and unlike prices, is so in-
timately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions'
successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arm's-length
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the be-
hest of or in combination with nonabor groups, falls within the protection
of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman
Act.23
1
The restriction was found to be within this nonstatutory exemp-
tion as it was within the legitimate concerns of the union.232
Thus, pre-Connell, labor's antitrust exemption was dependent
on whether labor acted alone, and if not, whether the union was
pursuing a legitimate interest. The mere fact that conduct may be
225. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
226. Id. at 672-73. Justice Douglas' opinion was joined by Black and Clark.
227. Goldberg's dissenting opinion appears in Local 189, Meatcutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697 (1965).
228. Id. at 710.
229. Id. at 712.
230. Id. at 721.
231. Local 189, Meatcutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965).
232. Id. at 694, 697.
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regulated by the labor laws was not determinative of the applica-
bility of the antitrust laws.
Impact of Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100233
Connell arose out of an organizational drive by Local 100, the
representative of the plumbing and mechanical trades in the Dal-
las area. While Local 100 had a multi-employer collective bargain-
ing agreement with the representatives of about seventy-five
mechanical contractors, it wanted to ensure that most, if not all,
mechanical contracting work in the area was performed by its
members. It therefore tried to get Connell Construction Co., and
other general contractors, to enter into an agreement that they
would only subcontract to firms that were parties to an agreement
with the union.2
Connell did not employ any members of Local 100 and none of
Connell's employees performed any plumbing work. Accordingly,
Local 100 did not seek to represent any of Connell's employees.
The agreement sought by the union specifically referred to itself
as "applying in the event of subcontracting in accordance with
Section 8(e)."
235
In the district court,236 Connell alleged that the contract vio-
lated the antitrust laws of Texas, the Texas "Right to Work" law
and the Sherman Antitrust Act.23 7 The plaintiff sought to perma-
nently enjoin the picketing and also sought a declaratory judg-
ment stating that Local 100's efforts to obtain the agreement were
illegal. The union took the position that the agreement was lawful
by reason of section 8(e).
In its findings, the district court noted that Local 100 had previ-
ously pressured another contractor into signing such an agree-
ment.23 8 That contractor had filed charges with the Board, but no
complaint was issued and the contractor was unsuccessful in its
appeal of the Board's failure to issue a complaint.239 This led the
district court to conclude that section 8(e) authorized the agree-
233. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
234. Id- at 620.
235. Id.
236. 78 LR2M. 3012 (1971).
237. Id-
238. Id. at 3013.
239. Id. at 3014.
ment.240 The court also concluded that if the agreement was law-
ful, the picketing to secure the agreement was lawful.241
The fact that Local 100 was a "stranger" and not interested in
representing any of Connell's employees was not a problem. The
court cited Norris-LaGuardia's broad definition of the phrase "la-
bor dispute" which does not limit itself to employer-employee re-
lationships.242 The court also found the construction industry
proviso to section 8(e) evidenced an intent by Congress to return
to Norris-LaGuardia's expanded scope of immunity without the
need for the parties to be in a proximate employer-employee rela-
tionship.243 The district court concluded its analysis by holding
that the agreement, being authorized by Congress, was not viola-
tive of the federal antitrust laws. The court also held that both
the Texas antitrust law and the Texas "Right-to-Work" laws were
preempted.244
The circuit court affirmed.245 On the antitrust issue, the court
reviewed previous Supreme Court holdings and determined that
here, where there was no conspiracy allegation (and none was or
could have been alleged here24 6 ), the issue was whether the
agreement sought involved a "legitimate union interest."247 The
court found that Local 100 was merely trying to organize subcon-
tractors in order to eliminate wage competition. Since the elimi-
nation of competition based on wages was the primary objective
of all unions, the interest of the union was legitimate. 248
In its analysis, the court recognized that the unique nature of.
the construction industry was relevant in determining whether
the agreement sought and its benefits were legitimate. 249 Accord-
ing to the court, the "core" of the problem was the "ambulatory"
nature of the industry-the lack of continuity in and duration of
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§101-15 (1976) pro-
vides:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons ... regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
243. 78 L.R.RM. 3012, 3014, quoting from National Woodwork Manufacturing
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 638 (1967).
244. 78 L.R.R.M. at 3014.
245. 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973).
246. Id. at 1165. This, however, does not mean that the agreement would neces-
sarily be safe from attack by an injured third party, such as a nonunion subcon-
tractor.
247. Id. at 1164.
248. Id. at 1167-68.
249. Id. at 1168.
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the employment relationship.250 Because of this, the union who
represented a trade which usually performed work that was sub-
contracted had a difficult problem. The subcontractor, who is the
immediate employer of the worker, can only employ the worker if
the general contractor retains the subcontractor for the project.
Local 100's contracts with mechanical subcontractors were use-
less unless these subcontractors received work. Thus Local 100
had a direct interest in seeing that Connell retained firms that
had union contracts.
25 1
At the very least, section 8(e) indicated that the union's goal
was legitimate. If section 8(e) allowed a union representing work-
ers employed by a general contractor to negotiate a union only
subcontracting clause despite the fact that such a clause would
have an anticompetitive effect, why should an outside union be
prohibited from seeking the same clause? The anticompetitive ef-
fect would be the same. Moreover, the only competition elimi-
nated by Local 100's efforts would be that caused by lower
standards or wages, the sine qua non of unionization.2
5 2
The court did not decide the straight labor law question. It
merely decided that section 8(e) either approved the agreement
or that the union's actions to secure the agreement was a viola-
tion of section 8(b) (4) .253 That issue should have been left for the
Board to determine.
254
There was a dissenting opinion in the circuit court which con-
cluded that Local 100 had violated both the labor and antitrust
laws.255 It acknowledged that the agreement in question came
within the literal terms of section 8(e) but rejected the applica-
tion of section 8(e) where the employer could not bargain for
something in return.256 Connell could get no concession from Lo-
cal 100 since they were not bargaining over a collective agree-
ment. All Connell could get was relief from Local 100's coercive
actions.25 7 Nor, said the dissent, did Local 100's lack of interest, as
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1168-69. This argument is a little disingenuous because unions nego-
tiate over work practices, crew size, technological changes and other cost items.
253. Id. at 1172-73. Specifically, the Court refers to §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1976).
254. 483 F.2d 1154, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1973).
255. Id. at 1176.
256. Id. at 1181.
257. Id.
to whether other trades were unionized, comport with Congres-
sional intent underlying section 8(e)-to prevent the friction that
arises when union and nonunion employees work side by side on
a construction project.258
On the antitrust issue, the dissent did not state that there was
liability, but it failed to find antitrust immunity for the union's ac-
tions. It is unclear whether the judge would have wanted a new
trial or whether he viewed nonimmunity as coterminous with lia-
bility, a proposition that has been feared and condemned by at
least one commentator in the antitrust field.259
The Supreme Court reversed and held against Local 100 on
both the antitrust and labor issues. 60 On the antitrust question,
the Court found that the Hutcheson "statutory" exemption was
inappropriate where there was an agreement with nonlabor.261
The "nonstatutory" exemption, illustrated by Jewel Tea, recog-
nizes that a national labor policy favoring the elimination of wage
competition will lessen business competition. This nonstatutory
exemption, however, does not countenance or "require that a
union have freedom to impose direct restraints on those who em-
ploy its members."262
The Court determined that Local 100 through its organizing
campaign and with the agreement signed by Connell used "direct
restraints on the business market" by "indiscriminately ex-
clud[ing] nonunion subcontractors.., even if their competitive
advantages were not derived from substandard wages . . . but
rather from more efficient operating methods."263 Moreover, since
the union had no interest in representing any of Connell's em-
ployees, it could not find shelter in the strong federal labor policy
favoring collective bargaining.264
On the question of whether the agreement was authorized by
section 8(e), the Court acknowledged that on its face, the con-
struction industry proviso seemed applicable. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, however, felt compelled to look at the cir-
cumstances surrounding the enactment of that provision.265 Ac-
cording to the majority, the construction industry proviso to
section 8(e) was included to solve the problems raised by the
258. Id. at 1182.
259. Handier, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 ANrrRusT L.J. 233, 239
(1971).
260. 421 U.S. 616 (1974).
261. Id. at 622.
262. Id. at 622.
263. Id. at 623.
264. Id. at 626.
265. Id. at 628. Justice Powell did not feel compelled to justify his jump into
the legislative history.
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Denver Building Trades decision.266 An amendment to section
8(b) (4), which was introduced with the proviso to section 8(e),
would have allowed common situs picketing, but it did not survive
the legislative process. 26v Presumably section 8(e), by allowing
subcontracting agreements, would prevent the need for picketing
if the contractor complied.
The majority noted, however, that the proviso was limited to
work done at the site and was designed to alleviate the problems
that might arise "when union men work continuously alongside
nonunion men.... " 2 6 8 Local 100's agreement did not limit itself
to site work and did not seek to prevent Connell from hiring non-
union workers for work that did not involve plumbing or steamfit-
ting. Therefore, the opinion held that the agreement was not
within the rationale of section 8(e).269
Justice Powell also expressed fear that a broader reading of
section 8(e) would give the construction unions "an almost unlim-
ited organizational weapon."270 Since one of the major aims of
Landrum-Griffin was to limit "top down" organizing, the Court
should not allow such a "glaring loophole" without a clear indica-
tion of congressional intent.2 71 The majority concluded that the
construction industry proviso to section 8(e) is limited to agree-
ments "within the context of collective bargaining relationships"
and "possibly to common situs relationships on particular jobsites
as well."272
The last argument raised by Local 100 was that even if the
agreement was not authorized by section 8(e), the remedies pro-
vided by the Act should be exclusive and that antitrust liability
should be precluded. The union argued that Congress expressly
rejected antitrust remedies when it passed Taft-Hartley and in-
stead created remedies under the Act. Justice Powell rejected
that argument because he found no similar legislative intent in
1959 when section 8(e) was enacted.273
266. NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951).
267. See 421 U.S. 616, 629 n.8 (1974).
268. Id. at 630, quoting from Drivers Local 595 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (1966).
269. Id. at 630-31.
270. Id. at 631.
271. Id. at 632-33.
272. Id. at 633.
273. Id. at 633-34.
The main dissenting opinion,274 written by Justice Stewart, ar-
gued that the agreement was governed by section 8(e) and that
the union's picketing was secondary activity governed by section
8(b) (4). He believed that Congress had clearly rejected antitrust
remedies in that area and had determined that the labor laws
should provide the exclusive remedy for any violation of the Act.
According to Justice Stewart, during the fifteen years between
Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley, both primary and secondary
activity were immune to antitrust sanction.275 Labor's abuse of
this freedom helped prompt Taft-Hartley. During the Taft-Hartley
debates, antitrust sanctions were proposed and rejected. Instead,
injured parties could get injunctive relief and actual damages.276
The scope of proscribed activities was set, in part, by section
8(b) (4).277 Section 8(e) was enacted to plug "technical loopholes"
in section 8(b) (4) and the remedies under section 303 of the
LMRA were simultaneously expanded to be coextensive with sec-
tion 8(b) (4).278 Justice Stewart conceded that the amendment
was not specifically for section 8(e) but that the union would have
had to have violated section 8(b) (4) if its agreement was not pro-
tected by section 8(e).2 79 Thus, if the agreement was not allowa-
ble under section 8(e), Local 100 had violated section 8(b) (4) and
Connell should seek its remedies under the labor law. If the
agreement was within the scope of the construction industry pro-
viso to section 8(e), there was no reason to consider antitrust
remedies.
The decision in Connell has been severely criticized, especially
in regard to its handling of the antitrust issues.280 Since the con-
struction industry will have to live with this holding and its prog-
eny, some brief attention should be given to this criticism before
any comment is made on the Court's interpretation of section
8(e) and its failure to understand the realities of construction.
Since there was an agreement with nonlabor, and since no con-
spiracy was alleged, neither United States v. Hutcheson281 nor
274. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion which focussed on the antitrust
issues. Id. at 638.
275. Id. at 639-40.
276. See §303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §187 (1976).
277. 421 U.S. 616, 639-46.
278. Id. at 646.
279. Id. at 647-48.
280. See St. Antoine, Connell" Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62
VA. L. REV. 603 (1976); Lovett, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Connell, 36 Omo
STATE L.J. 852 (1975); Bartosic, The Supreme Court 1974 Term: The Allocation of
Power in Deciding Labor Law Policy, 62 VA. L. REV. 533 (1976); Comment, The
Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 234 (1975); Note, The Labor Anti-
trust Conflict, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 812 (1975).
281. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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United Mine Workers v. Pennington282 is applicable. Instead, Lo-
cal 189, Meateutters v. Jewel Tea Co. 283 is the appropriate starting
point. Jewel Tea allowed an antitrust exemption for agreements
intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions, even
where there was a direct restraint on the product market.284 It is
difficult to see how an agreement to extend the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement to other employees would not be
within this rationale.285
The fact that there was an organizational purpose should not
have changed the test. Organizational agreements have previ-
ously withstood antitrust scrutiny.286 The test should have been
whether the agreement was broader than the union's legitimate
interest.287 Instead, the Court acknowledged that the goals were
legitimate but balked because the means were too effective.
The second focus of criticism has been on the question of
whether Congress intended the labor law remedies to be exclu-
sive in this situation.288 Both Justices Powell and Stewart agree
that Congress chose not to allow antitrust remedies for secondary
activity when it passed Taft-Hartley. They disagree only in regard
to the 1959 amendments. Justice Powell, however, argues that the
1959 amendments were only intended to close technical loopholes
in section 8(b)(4). Surely allowing antitrust damages is more
than closing a technical loophole. Justice Powell's conclusion
here seems to contradict his premise.
On a more general level, allowing a further intrusion of the anti-
trust law into the field of labor relations frustrates the achieve-
ment of any centralized labor policy. As one writer notes, there is
an irony in the Court's preemption of Texas law for fear that it
will interfere with comprehensive federal labor legislation, when
the Court allows the antitrust law to interfere with federal labor
policy.28
9
The decision is equally bad in its interpretation of section 8(e).
The Court reviews the legislative history of section 8(e) and con-
282. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
283. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
284. Lovett, supra note 280, at 862.
285. St. Antoine, supra note 280, at 626.
286. See, e.g., Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
287. St. Antoine, supra note 280, at 622.
288. Id. at 626; see also Bartosic, supra note 280, at 597-98, and I-HRv. L, REV.,
supra note 280, at 239.
289. Bartosic, supra note 280, at 592. See also Lovett, supra note 280, at 875.
tends that it includes only "bare references" to the pattern of bar-
gaining in the construction industry.290 Senator Kennedy's
statement of bargaining patterns291 is cited in a footnote of the
opinion but otherwise ignored. That remark lends support to the
contention of Local 100 that the agreement was within the inten-
tion of Congress in enacting section 8(e).
The Court's remarks in regard to the NLRB v. Denver Building
& Construction Trades Council (Denver Building Trades)
292 situ-
ation shows a similar kind of token approach to the problem. The
problem in Denver Building Trades was caused by the fact that
work is freely subcontracted. Union agreements without subcon-
tracting clauses are useless-the contractor can always choose to
have a subcontractor do the union's work and avoid the collective
bargaining agreement. For the union that works for subcontrac-
tors, the problem is slightly different. That union wants work to
be subcontracted, but subcontracted to a union firm. Even if Con-
gress did not amend section 8(b) (4) to allow picketing in the ab-
sence of the clause, there is nothing in a reference to an attempt
to get construction unions out from under the problem illustrated
by Denver Building Trades which could lead to a narrow con-
struction of section 8(e).
The majority's naivete also shows in its reference to the prob-
lem of union and nonunion men working side by side. The con-
flict is caused, if one exists, by the fact that nonunion workers
threaten to take away union jobs. They do not respect estab-
lished craft lines and do not belong to an organization that will
support the other worker's union in a struggle against contractors.
The Court, however, seems to view the problem as similar to that
of mixing people of different races, religions or political philoso-
phy.
The Court complains that Local 100 does not seek to insure that
all workers on the job are union, yet it finds fault with Local 100
being a stranger to the situation, i.e., not trying to represent any
of Connell's employees. Surely Local 100 would be even further
removed and out of place if it tried to impose working conditions
or union membership on those outside of its craft, which is what
the Court's criticism suggests.
The Court also complains that the agreement was not limited in
scope to work at a construction site. Assuming that the agree-
ment only applied to plumbing and mechanical work, this com-
plaint is inappropriate. Connell was a general contractor. It only
290. 421 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1974).
291. See text accompanying note 209 supra.
292. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
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worked at construction sites. There is no nonsite work that mem-
bers of Local 100 could have performed for it. Perhaps the Court
means a particular job site. But that is to suggest site by site ne-
gotiations, a concept which would "confound anyone even re-
motely familiar with the construction industry."293
Ultimately, the Court seems most concerned with the fact that
Local 100's organizing tactics would be too effective and in contra-
diction of Landrum-Griflin's intention to limit "top down" organiz-
ing. But Landrum-Griffm contained section 8(f) which in essence
said that top down organizing is proper if not necessary in con-
struction. Section 8(f) is a recognition of the heeds of the indus-
try and the inability of traditional industrial democracy to work in
the construction industry. Congress clearly allowed unions in the
industry to do the organizing from the top. Yet the Court ignores
section 8(f) and narrowly construes section 8(e) under the guise
of employee free choice. Again, the Court never deals with how
the employee is to express any choice in deciding whether to sup-
port the union.
If the desires of Local 100 were so out of step with the wishes of
the workers, the picketing by Local 100 would not have had any
effect on Connell. Workers can express such a negative choice if
Local 100 is allowed to try to organize. If no attempt to organize is
allowed by the Court, the worker gets no opportunity to support
or ignore the union and once again, the contractor is given free
rein.
Ultimately, if Connell allows agreements that are limited in
scope to specific jobsites and/or collective bargaining relation-
ships, its impact on labor relations in the construction industry
may be minimal. (Local 100's tactic was novel and the Court was
not eliminating a traditional union weapon.) Such a reading of
Connell is almost invited by the Court; at three points in the
opinion, Justice Powell notes the absence of a collective bargain-
ing relationship, and at two of these points, the agreement's fail-
ure to be restricted to site work is mentioned.294
So far this distinction has proved critical in several cases. In
Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB,295 the D.C. Circuit upheld the va-
lidity of a broad subcontracting clause even though it was con-
293. Bartosic, supra note 280, at 596.
294. 421 U.S. at 625-26, 633 & 635.
295. 105 L.R.R.M. 2818 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
tained in a Section 8(f) prehire agreement and not limited to
particular jobsites or jobsites where union employees were work-
ing.29 6 Two federal district courts have reached similar conclu-
sions and ratified subcontracting clauses in the face of a challenge
under Connell.297 Similarly, in Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwest-
ern Pennsylvania Building and Construction Trades Council,
298
the absence of a collective bargaining relationship between an
owner and a local trades council left an agreement between the
parties subject to antitrust scrutiny.29
9
One circuit court initially took a broad view of Connell. In Pa-
cific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc. v. NLRB,300 the court said agreements prohibiting the use of
nonunion workers will be allowed "only when the employer or his
subcontractor has employees who are members of the signatory
union at work at some time on the jobsite at which the employer
wishes to engage a nonunion contractor." Reargument was
granted,301 however, and the full bench has reversed and ren-
296. The employers had argued that a section 8(f) relationship was different
than the "collective bargaining relationship" required by Connell. Id. at 2828. The
court agreed with the Board's conclusion that section 8(f) agreements were the
means by which collective bargaining relationships were established in the con-
struction industry. Id. The court also rejected the employers' attempt to limit
valid section 8(e) agreements to particular jobsites. Broad subcontracting agree-
ments were part of the industry before 1959 and therefore ratified by the Lan-
drum-Griffin bill. Id. at 2832-33. Moreover these kinds of agreements were needed
because of the nature of the industry; subcontracting was the "usual rather than
the extraordinary practice." Id. at 2834.
297. Signatory Negotiating Committee v. Local 9, Operating Engineers, 447 F.
Supp. 1385 (D.C. Colo. 1978); Bullard Contracting Corp., 464 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.N.Y.
1979).
298. 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979).
299. See generally King & Moser, Muko and Conex: The Third Circuit Responds
to Connell, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 79 (1980).
300. 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). The court reversed two Board decisions al-
lowing agreements which prohibited the subcontracting of work to nonunion firms.
The court held that such agreements were only sheltered by the construction in-
dustry proviso to section 8(e) "vhen a collective bargaining relationship exists
and even then only when the employer or his subcontractor has employees who
are members of the signatory union at work at some time at the jobsite at which
the employer wishes to engage a nonunion subcontractor." Id. at 1347. The court
found the construction industry proviso to be directed solely at the problems en-
gendered by union employees working alongside nonunion workers. But a closer
reading suggests that the court's real objection was with the scope of the agree-
ment and therefore its effectiveness:
The agreement between the AGC [Association of General Contractors]
and Engineers, for instance, forecloses to nonunion firms employment op-
portunities with any of 200 construction contractors throughout Oregon
and southwest Washington. The potential coercive effect of such an agree-
ment is manifest.
Id. at 1350.
301. 105 L.R.R.M. 2496 (1980).
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dered a decision that is in accord with Schriver and Muko.302
Judge Canby, writing for the majority, felt that Connell should be




It should be evident that the construction industry is not ame-
nable to an uncritical application of the labor laws. The industry's
structure creates some unique problems, especially in regard to
employee free choice as to representation. Congress has recog-
nized this and has made some special accommodations to the
needs of the industry. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and the
Board have not. Rather, they have promoted the employer's abil-
ity to evade contractual obligations and avoid union pressure.
This is extremely disturbing because the Court and the Board
are espousing employee free choice. Are we to assume that they
honestly fail to perceive that their decisions do not implement
that stated purpose? If they are choosing to restrict union power
because it does not necessarily reflect the desires of the employ-
ees, they should devise some means of effectuating employee free
choice. As of now, the solutions devised leave the workers at the
mercy of the employers; there is no indication that workers would
prefer unilateral employer determination of wages, hours and
working conditions.
In reading the opinions, one gets a sense that the hidden
agenda is to decrease union power in the construction industry.
The unions are viewed as too big, too powerful, economically and
societally counterproductive. Even assuming that the Court is
correct in assuming that our society would benefit from a diminu-
tion of union muscle in construction (a position that is probably
based more on construction union myth than reality), the Court
must look at the unions in terms of what they do for the employ-
ees.
An employee in construction has no job security or tenure. The
union provides a home base. In the open shop or merit shop sec-
tor, the employees have no pension benefits, and, most often, no
health and welfare benefits outside of statutorily determined
302. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v.
NLRB Dec., slip op. No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. 1981).
303. Id. at 1762.
worker's compensation. The unions provide these benefits. A
union employee need not worry about accruing a fixed number of
years' employment with one company in order to have a pension
upon retirement. There is no analogous security in the open
shop.
The Court should not leave the workers at the mercy of the em-
ployers because of some vague notions of unions in construction
being bad or too powerful. The issue stated by the Court and the
Board should be adhered to in fact-employee choice. At present
this is demonstrated in very strong terms whenever a picket line
is honored. Until there is evidence to the contrary and until a
new mechanism for evaluating employee choice is devised, union
preference should be presumed and the Court and the Board
must go back to a neutral position in regard to labor relations in
the construction industry.
